On Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics (Part I)

A Review on Helmut Thielecke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1: Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979). pp. 1-160.

Synopsis of the Book

I. CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN THE AGE OF SECULARISM

Christian tradition’s concept of reality has been questioned by secularization. With the progress of secularization, humanity has been able to cease its resistance under the yoke of Christian imperatives, states, and customs. For Thielicke, the demonization of the world is a serious concern to be addressed in relation to ethics. It follows with the challenge of the autonomous spheres of life and the false theological sanctioning of self-contained, self-regulating world or autonomy (Eigengesetzlichkeit) as in the case of the Nazified Christian Germans’ slogan: Germany our goal, Christ our power. Another challenge to evangelicals is the autonomy in the morally independent subject (privatization of ethics) in the tradition of Kant, Ritschl, Hermann, etc.

In the Challenge of Humanism, the author posed the challenge in relation to the interchangeability of faith. With Schleiermacher in sight, the subjective religious feeling threatened the essence of faith. This is the same threat regarding the interchangeability of ethics posited by the humanism of Melanchton’s concept of virtue. Accordingly, he secularized the theology of Luther. In the midst of these challenges, Thielicke insists on the distinctiveness of Christian ethics at the level of motivation of the action. It should be sought explicitly and exclusively. He implicates (using the examples of the Pharisees) that these secularists are apostates. Hence, the specifically ethical Christian element is found in the level of motives for it differentiates what is hypocrisy and not. The basis of action should be its genuine nature as a deed for the glory of God. The action may be called Christian when its basis and goals (telos) is determined by the kurios. The differentiation of Christian ethics from the ethics of disposition can be clarified in contrast to the philosophy of Kant. Disposition is something imposed as a task to be accomplished, not as a given fact (actuality). Kant’s disposition relies so much on the human ability and freedom. The motive is more of personal initiative. But what is to be clarified here is the involvement of new existence where a person must first be in motus (motion) or history of God to anything that is Christian. He must first be the object of justification to be a subject of sanctification. This is the very context whereby one can speak of the level of motives scrutinized here.

The traditional incorporation of ethics into dogmatics raises major questions. Realizing that the early church had no independent ethics, discussions concerning ethical standards is a controversial matter for what they addressed before are specific cases on which they dealt with in their own context. It remains within the sphere of dogmatics. This is the same situation that continued in the scholasticism era and the Reformation. Ethical concerns encompassed political, social, and relational matters. Even so, there is no independent discipline that leads to an attempt to establish theological ethics. But if there is one rule that dominates ethical stance in Christian history, it is the rule of Christian love. Thielicke develops the relation of dogmatics and ethics. Here faith is seen as equally the content of dogmatics and ethics. Allegedly, “Faith is the content of dogmatics inasmuch as dogmatics is faith reflecting on its object, and treating that object with methodical rigor, i.e., in the manner appropriate to it. Faith is the content of ethics inasmuch as ethics is faith inquiring as to the conduct faith posits for man towards himself, his neighbor, the world, and its orders.”(37)

The author makes it clear that ethics should not be considered as an additional or supplementary discipline. It should be made an interpretation of the believer’s existence in faith. Thus, the task of Christian ethics must consist entirely as a watchman for the evangelical church 1) in placing questions to the secular understanding of reality, 2) in demanding responsibility from it, and 3) presenting to it as a system by which man hopes to be protected against divine attack.

It should be noted that the Christian is a citizen of two aeons—the relationship of both continuity and discontinuity. Believers are simultaneously a member of the old and new aeons. They may live in the flesh but not according to the flesh. This concept heavily relies upon the theological framework of Luther’s two worlds and his proposition “at once righteous and sinful”(simul justus et peccator). Ethics has it place within the tension between the old and new aeons, not on one alone. It is necessary to assert that the believer must stand (because of the dealy of the Parousia) in relation to continuation with the old aeon towards the fulfillment of the new. Due to the fact that the old aeon is nearing to its end and the new aeon has dawned in the Christ-event, the manifestation of Christian ethics can never remain as an inward, concealed, and private action.

The eschatological character of Christian ethics is first mysteriously. There is a presence of irresolvable tension between time and eternity, between this aeon and the coming aeon. Christian ethics is also a Christological mystery (the tension between the deity and humanity of Christ). It also rests upon the mystery of the new being in the Spirit as well as a sacramental mystery (tension between the sign and the signified). Nonetheless, the aim of Christian ethics is not to solve or overcome the tensions it consists, but to go through it like walking in two worlds. In the strict sense, it is a wayfarers’ theology (theologia viatorum) that deal with the “not yet” as well as of the coming Jesus Christ. “Theological ethics is eschatological or it is nothing”(47).

II. THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS

The “New Obedience” in evangelical ethics is focused upon justification and sanctification. It is totally different to philosophical and natural ethics. Philosophical ethic’s starting point is self-realization within man or the objective value outside the ego, whereas evangelical ethics starts with the presupposition of the ethical act, not the goal. The ethical act is an expression subsequent (not in temporality or time, but subordination) to justification—taken as reality. Works in the state of justification serve by way of demonstration. While philosophical acts are determined by the task to be accomplished or performed (Aufgabe), evangelical ethics are determined by the given (Gabe). Thus, justification is the presupposition of evangelical ethics. The present task is to determine the relationship between the gift (justification) and the implied act in that gift (sanctification).

The dual motivation of good works in the justified must be clarified through exposition of the details of the Augsburg Confession (article 6 “The New Obedience”). There are two motivational standpoints that Thielicke identified in that creed. Accordingly, faith is bound to bring forth good fruits and works must be applied to do God’s will because they are God’s command. These seemingly contradicting motivations must be examined with considerations to important sources and interpretations. The motive of good fruits in the Bible is not apprehension of the Spirit in life but simply fruits of the Spirit. As long as that life belongs to the Spirit, there is no need of apprehension. Evil works are simply works of the flesh. Both the Spirit and flesh are factors outside the ego to which the ego relates. In the Johannine writings the motive behind obedience is new basis of existence of being born anew. External manifestations are to be expressions of the internal motivation, a new bondage resulting to new works.

The motive of good fruits in Luther and the Confessions is not similar. A shocking thesis of Luther is the significance of faith and unbelief. It is emphasized by a hypothesis that if adultery takes place in faith, it would be no sin; if one tries to worship God in unbelief, it is an act of idolatry. In his strict differentiation of faith and unbelief (either by God or God’s opponent), the choice is either-or, no compromise. For him, all natural ethics are self-creation in opposition to the First Commandment. In this case, the justified man is totally differentiated from any self-made ego. The very being of the person exists in the persons’ works, wills, and desires. Luther describes the will as the representative of the whole ego. The imperatives are not oriented to the concrete action but on the thematic significance to keep the First Commandment in fear and love. Imperatives are the preconditions of automatic and new obedience.

Thielicke believes that the co-ordination of the indicative and the imperative has to avoid one-sided emphasis. When imperative and indicative emphasis tends to isolate itself, the result is an independent form of the ego. Faith is driven to seek constant reassurance from perfectionistic experiences and doubt. The point of reference is not imparted from the historical Christ, but to itself. For Thielicke, the two-fold significance of the imperative has something to do with the demand to decide for the Spirit and the demand to renounce whatever hinders the Spirit. The answer to the connection between the relationship of indicative and the imperative is found in the biblical concept of man. Man is not perceived as an independent subject but as a relational being. To be specific, the justified man is related to the Holy Spirit. There is a decision involved in adhering to the domination of the Spirit for the justified man. The person is set into a particular relationship whereby the automatic process is in motion. The person must consider himself dead to sin and alive to God in Christ. The demand is always to let God the Spirit work to bring mortification and transformation.

Thielicke insists on the constant partnership of the Law and Gospel. In the perspective of Calvin, the Law and the Gospel are the two modes of operation of one God. He began with the personal union of the one author, thus, the unity of both Law and Gospel is the main point of teleological coordination. However, Luther differentiated the distinction between Law and Gospel. His starting point is the Gospel-event that took place to rescue man from the judgment of the Law. As a miracle (referring to the Gospel), he resisted the teleological relationship between the two. Because of this denial in knowledge of the relation between Law and Gospel, knowledge is only attributed to the Holy Spirit. As a result, in the Calvinistic tradition, unhistorical trend can be traced inclined towards two concentric circles that separate the Old and New Testaments. Luther’s emphasis is more on historical revelation focused upon the Christ-event, God’s becoming history. This is expressed as finitum capax infiniti (the finite can encompass the infinite). In Lutheran, the Law continues to be significant among the justified. Any attempt to isolate both Law and the Gospel tends to treat existence as unhistorical. Here, the true function of the Law, in relation to the Gospel, is to “gauze in the wound” for there is no healing of this wound. Thus, each one has to go daily and pray “Forgive us our trespasses”.

The continuing pedagogic significance of the Law for believers is to serve: 1) as a loving reminder for man’s justified existence, 2) as a comfort in time of doubt, and 3) as a servant of love in the political sphere.

Thielicke maintains that the concept of the Imago Dei belong to theological ethics. God’s will in salvation history has something to do with the Law. The Law always relates to fallen humanity, to expose sin and keep it exposed. It is God’s will as altered by the fallen world. The imago refers to the relationality (I-Thou). This broken image (due to the fall) is seen in Christ. The imago is also understood as a task and as destiny. The divine likeness preferably implies a teleological view since Genesis did not say anything about the constituent qualities of it. This means that there is something ineffable concerning the Imago Dei—something that can not make it a subject of concrete statements. And this is rooted upon in the very nature of the mysterious matter itself.